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Following the inaccurate evaluation of the default risk of certain financial products—such as 
subprime mortgages and derivatives—that affected the stability of securities markets, the reliability of 
credit rating agencies (CRAs) has been questioned. CRAs’ activities have exhibited a lack of due 
diligence and deficiency in their assessment of corporations’ creditworthiness. Moreover, this 
underscores the failings of the issuer-agency relationship that characterizes the ratings business 
model. This relationship is fraught with major conflicts of interest because the purposes of issuers 
with regard to their ratings often do not square with investors’ need to receive reliable ratings 
information. This article argues that CRAs exhibit potential conflicts of interest because they have a 
financial incentive to accommodate the preferences of bond issuers owing to the fact that the rater is 
selected and paid by the issuer. This heavy dependence gives rise to ratings inflation and inaccuracy. 
What is crucial for the raters and, needless to say, the markets is to increase the quality of publicly 
available information before it is used in a rating assessment. 
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1. Setting the scene of CRAs 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) tend to be cast in the role of watchdogs of securities on 
account of their function in reducing information asymmetries between market participants.1 
At the very least, credit rating is a source of public information for investment decisions. 
However, CRAs are not supposed to measure a security’s potential for price appreciation. 
They collect dispersed information on the financial position of borrowers and the default risk 
of certain products (e.g. derivatives, asset-backed securities, bonds, loans and commercial 
paper), and condense it into a single measure of relative credit risk. Credit ratings express risk 
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1 Bruce G. Carruthers, ‘From uncertainty toward risk: the case of credit ratings’ (2013) 11(3) Socio-Economic 
Review, 530. It is observed that the function of CRAs to mitigate the uncertainty in credit markets—by 
managing the information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers—has evolved into a key component of 
global financial governance. As a result, credit ratings began to govern the allocation of trade credit, consumer 





in relative rank order and are not predictive of a specific frequency of default or loss.2 
Elaborating credit analysis, CRAs use the terms “investment grade” and “speculative grade” 
to describe the categories ‘AAA’ to ‘BBB’ (investment grade) and ‘BB’ to ‘D’ (speculative 
grade). The term “non-investment grade” or “speculative grade” generally refers to debt 
securities where the issuer currently has the ability to repay but faces significant 
uncertainties, e.g. adverse business or financial circumstances that could affect credit risk.3 
As stated by the one of the leading CRAs, ‘credit ratings are designed primarily to be our 
forward-looking opinions about creditworthiness and unlike other types of opinions, such as, 
for example, those provided by doctors or lawyers, credit ratings opinions are not intended to 
be a prognosis or recommendation’.4 There is no doubt that CRA intends its ratings to be an 
‘opinion’ but it is useful to understand whether the intention of the CRA is of any relevance 
in determining the legal nature of a rating. 
This article examines the business model of CRAs considering the system of disclosure of 
ratings and its interplay with the supervisory articulation introduced by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).5 The evidence now emerging on ESMA’s powers 
on CRAs’ activities suggests that the normative framework has been effective after the 
implementation of 2013 CRA Regulation.6 Section two offers an overview of the role of 
CRAs and the applicable regulatory regime in the ratings industry. Section three provides an 
analysis of the main issues that affect reliability of the solicited and unsolicited ratings. It can 
be noted that the solicited services show a close relationship between issuers and raters which 
results in dubious practices to the benefit of investors. The unsolicited services highlights the 
opacity of the rating process in the absence of issuer input and unclear access to public 
information. Section four considers the information system of CRAs and the potential risks of 
                                                 
2 There are three types of credit rating ‘scales’: (1) the fundamental ordinal scale which is used by CRAs to 
position the creditworthiness of an issuer or instrument; (2) financial market credit spreads, which result from 
the investment decisions of bond investors; and (3) market-implied credit ratings, which are derived from a 
combination of mathematical modeling of the arbitrage equilibrium prices of an issuer’s equity and assets, 
probability theories and empirical observations of past defaults. 
3 Therefore, the terms “investment grade” and “speculative grade” are used as market conventions. Investment 
grade categories indicate relatively low to moderate credit risk, while ratings in the “speculative” categories 
either signal a higher level of credit risk or that a default has already occurred. See Iain MacNeil, ‘Credit rating 
agencies: regulation and financial stability’ in Thomas Cottier, Rosa M. Lastra and Christian Tietje (eds), The 
Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs (Cambridge: CUP 2014) 179. 
4 Standard & Poor’s, ‘Guide to Credit Rating Essentials. What are credit ratings and how do they work?’ (2011), 
available at www.standardandpoors.com. 
5 Regulation No 513/2011 designated ESMA as the single supervisor of credit rating agencies within the EU. 
According to Regulation 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and Council, ESMA shall act within the powers 
conferred by its establishing Regulation and within the scope of EU Regulation 1060/2009/EC. 
6 European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘ESMA fines DBRS Ratings Ltd. for internal control failings’, 





faulty ratings. It is suggested that the lack of transparency brings about an imbalance of 
information between parties to trade (one so severe that exchange is impeded). It is manifest 
that the party with superior information (rating agency) relating to the probability of default 
can opportunistically use it to induce the other party (issuer) into unexpected and undesired 
outcomes. The importance of sound validation techniques for rating models stems from the 
proposition that poor quality assessments could lead to sub-optimal financial products 
allocation. Section five discusses the problem of conflicts of interest by providing a critical 
appraisal of the limitations of CRAs’ compliance function for reviewing and monitoring 
methodologies. Policymakers are primarily relying on the procedures a CRA has in place for 
managing issuers’ information. Consequently, investors should be able to evaluate the risk 
that a published rating is compromised by the disclosed conflict. The last section draws some 
concluding observations. 
 
2. The role of CRAs and the applicable regulatory framework 
The usefulness of a CRA is dependent upon its reliability in making assessments and 
public acceptability.7 These two elements, i.e. reliability and acceptability, reflect the fact that 
market participants use the ratings of the three leading CRAs (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s 
Investors Service and Fitch) because the market trusts their ratings and participants know that 
other players will also accept their evaluations.8  
Once they have issued a rating, CRAs maintain oversight over issuers and their securities, 
and investors are informed through the rating report when changes affect issuers and financial 
products.9  Despite the CRAs’ claims of scrutiny, the changes in ratings do not seem to be 
related to changes in the individual probabilities of default of the rated firms.10 The internal 
models used to formulate the ratings are based on confidential information passed by the 
issuer rather than being the outcome of CRAs’ due diligence. The risk of ratings volatility lies 
behind the fact that issuers are more willing to get a ‘triple-A’ for gaining access to capital 
                                                 
7 Reiner H. Kraakman, ‘Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy’ (1986) 2(1) Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization, 54. 
8 Carsten Thomas Ebenroth and Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., ‘The International Rating Game: An Analysis of the 
Liability of Rating Agencies in Europe, England, and the United States’ (1993) 24(3) Law & Policy in 
International Business, 783. 
9 David Ramos Muñoz, The Law of Transnational Securitization (Oxford: OUP 2010) 263, where it is observed 
that ‘ratings are crucial to determine the regulatory capital required for an investment. For that reason, reliability 
of rating agencies is vital’.  
10 Paulo Viegas de Carvalho, Paul Anthony Laux and Joâo Pedro Pereira, ‘The stability and accuracy of credit 
ratings’ (2014) 34-36, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2504972. According to the ‘accuracy ratio’ indicator 
to evaluate the performance of a rating system, it is documented that ratings are not “through-the-cycle”, 





markets and selling their products. In this way, rating updates appear an advertising tool to 
attract bond investors to lend to firms rated by CRAs and, at the same time, a disincentive for 
investors to conduct their own assessment on securities. In other words, rating changes seem 
driven by economic targets—such as marketing the profitable ‘opinion’—rather than 
information motives. It is questionable whether rating maintains accuracy and stability of the 
public grades provided to financial markets since there are no internal written policies and 
procedures in the CRAs to address the opacity of their methodologies.11  
Rating methodologies evolve over time and continue to be adjusted in response to new 
information and economic developments. These adjustments tend to be small, and CRAs are 
generally careful to keep the number of rating changes triggered by these adjustments to a 
minimum although there are some methodological differences among the big three CRAs, 
their ratings do track each other very closely. Rating methodologies refer to the methods and 
processes that govern CRAs’ application of criteria to a particular rating or practice i.e. 
corporate, public finance, asset-backed securities.12 When assigning and monitoring ratings, 
CRAs use financial statements, information about the issuer, industry and market condition 
although the related weights of these factors utilized in determining a rating are not publicly 
disclosed.13 This can affect the expectations of investors about the creditworthiness of firms 
and the risks of unexpected default. In the Enron failure, gatekeepers certified the issuer’s 
compliance with an inventory of highly technical rules—without the auditor necessarily 
taking responsibility for the overall accuracy of the issuer’s statement of its financial 
position.14 
                                                 
11 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘2015 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization’, December 2015, 18-20. See also Nan S. Ellis and 
Steven B. Dow, ‘Attaching Criminal Liability to Credit Rating Agencies: Use of the Corporate Ethos Theory of 
Criminal Liability’ (2014) 17(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, 169. 
12 Standard & Poor’s, ‘Methodology: Credit Stability Criteria’ (2011), available at 
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect; Moody’s Investors Service, ‘Rating Symbols and Definitions’, 
August 2014, 5; Fitch Ratings, ‘Definition of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion’, January 2014, 9-10. It is 
generally considered that the key methods to measure the creditworthiness (or likelihood of default) of an issuer 
or an obligation are the ‘probability of default’ and the ‘recovery rate’. The “probability of default” measures 
the relative default risk of an issuer and is based on the probability of occurrence of a delayed payment of 
interest or principal on any financial obligation. The “recovery rate” is measured by the recovery rating, an 
evaluation that indicates the uncertainty of the recovery prospects when default has occurred. Beyond the 
likelihood of default other important factors are: (1) the payment priority of an obligation following default; (2) 
the projected recovery that an investor would expect to receive if an obligation defaults; and (3) the credit 
stability. An example would be the specific quantitative measures that CRAs use to assess current and future 
cash flows and the ability to cover expected interest expense for issuers in specific industry sectors.  
13 IOSCO, ‘The role of Credit Rating Agencies in structured finance markets. Final Report’ (May 2008) 9-10. 
See also Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s 
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies’, July 2008, 13-15.   






At the international level, the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies of 2015 provides a set of guidelines and practical measures for implementing the 
governance of ratings industry aiming at enhancing transparency of information. 15  The 
IOSCO measures intend to address the following objectives: (1) quality and integrity of the 
credit rating process; (2) CRA independence and the avoidance of conflicts of interest; (3) 
CRA responsibilities to the investing public, rated entities, obligors, underwriters and 
arrangers; (4) risk management and employee training; and (5) disclosure and communication 
with market participants. The Basel III Accord has confirmed that the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct is the international benchmark for CRAs’ rules of conduct. Under the Basel III rules, 
national supervisors should refer to the IOSCO Code when determining External Credit 
Assessment Institution (ECAI) eligibility. 16  As stated by the Basel Committee, ‘external 
ratings that can be used for the capital purposes, according to the Basel II framework, are 
limited to the ratings provided by recognized ECAIs’.17 
ECAIs play an important function in the regulatory standards of capital requirements18 
and in setting capital models for credit risk.19 The Basel Committee affirmed that rating 
systems are the cornerstone for the calculation of banks’ regulatory capital according to the 
‘internal ratings-based approach’ of Basel II.20 In this view, ECAI recognition provides a 
basis for risk-weighted capital requirements calculations under the ‘Standardized Approach’21 
and ‘Securitization Ratings Based Approaches’.22 Such approaches are designed to increase 
                                                 
15 IOSCO, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’, FR05/2015, March 2015, 3, available 
at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD482.pdf. 
16 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks 
and banking systems’, June 2011, 52. The European Central Bank (ECB) has defined an external credit 
assessment institution (ECAI) as ‘an institution whose credit assessments may be used by credit institutions for 
determining the risk weight of exposures in accordance with the Capital Requirements Directive’. See ECB, 
‘The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area’, September 2006, 45. 
17 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Stocktaking on the use of credit ratings’, The Joint Forum, June 
2009, 19. 
18 Especially in the so-called pillar I ‘Minimum Capital Requirements’ of Basel II. See Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’, June 2006, 
27-29. 
19 Under Basel II, banks used ratings assigned by recognized CRAs in determining credit risk weights for many 
of their institutional credit exposures. See Kern Alexander, ‘Bank capital regulation and the role of external 
ratings: Unresolved issues’ in Jan Kleineman, Lars Gorton and Aron Verstandig (eds), Perspectives on Credit 
Rating Agencies (Stockholm: Författarna, Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law Jure Förlag AB 2013) 235-
236. 
20 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems’, Working 
Paper No 14, May 2005, 7. 
21  Under the ‘standardized approach’, banks that engage in less complex forms of lending and credit 
underwriting and that have simpler control structures may use external measures of credit risk to assess the 
credit quality of their borrowers for regulatory capital purposes. See Kern Alexander, ‘The Risk of Ratings in 
Bank Capital Regulation’ (2014) 25(2) European Business Law Review, 302. 
22 Under the ‘Securitization Ratings Based Approaches’, banks must apply the securitization framework for 





the risk sensitivity of capital requirements for banks. The regulation of ECAIs was 
incorporated into EU legislation through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)23 that 
established for the first time a framework of recognition of CRAs as ECAIs by competent 
European authorities.24  
ECAI’s activities raise the issue of ‘how important it is for external rating agencies to 
retain credibility by posting ratings for bank loans that will prove to be ex post accurate’.25 In 
this context, ECAIs’ performance has come under fire for their handling of the 2007-09 
financial crisis when they failed adequately to assess the risk associated with securitization 
exposures. The crisis has demonstrated that external credit ratings did not adequately reflect 
the risk of certain structured finance asset classes such as mortgage backed securities and 
resecuritization positions of an underlying transaction.26  The growing demand for rating 
services, which has been driven by the advent of new financial products, has also contributed 
to ECAIs being more in the spotlight. 27  The banks, which were creating asset-backed 
securities and products based on them, paid ratings agencies to rate securitized instruments in 
order to improve their marketability to investors.28  
The inadequacy of Basel II provisions for the purpose of preventing banks from reducing 
their capital charges by pooling loans in off-balance-sheet vehicles gave rise to significant 
changes through the new Basel III Accord.29 Paragraph 121 of the Accord states that ‘banks 
                                                                                                                                                        
or similar structures that contain features common to both. See Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale and John 
Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International Regulation of Systemic Risk (Oxford: OUP 
2006) 41. 
23 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ 2006 L 177, p. 1). The Directive has been replaced by 
Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms—Capital Requirements Directive IV (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338). Recital 73 in the preamble to 
the Capital Requirements Directive IV states that ‘the recognition of a credit rating agency as an external credit 
assessment institution (ECAI) should not increase the foreclosure of a market already dominated by three 
undertakings. EBA, the Member States’ central banks and the ECB, without making the process easier or less 
demanding, should provide for the recognition of more credit rating agencies as ECAIs in order to open the 
market to other undertakings’. 
24 See Annex VI, Part 3, para 1 to Directive 2006/48/EC. 
25 Patrick Honohan, ‘Perverse Effects of a Ratings-Related Capital Adequacy System’, World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper Series No 2364, 2000, 2. 
26 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘The Proposed Revised Ratings-Based Approach’, Working Paper 
No 23, January 2013, 3. The Basel Committee clarified that ‘the underlying transaction is a ‘resecuritisation 
where the pool contained at least one tranched exposure’. 
27 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Revisions to the Basel Securitisation Framework’, Consultative 
Document, December 2012, 4. The paper states that the emphasis placed on credit ratings within the Basel 
securitization framework resulted in rating agency errors flowing through to regulatory capital requirements. 
28 Julia Black, ‘Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2008, 10. 
29 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks 
and banking system’, December 2010 (rev June 2011) 52-53. For an academic view see Markus K. 





will not be allowed to “cherry-pick” the assessments provided by different ECAIs and 
arbitrarily change the use of ECAIs’.30 Under the Basel II framework, banking regulators 
allowed banks to use credit ratings from approved ECAIs when setting their capital 
requirements.31 Although this has been at least mitigated by Basel III, as long as banks are 
permitted to make extensive use of ratings for capital adequacy purposes, their internal rating 
scales will continue to be dependent on the ECAIs’ statements.32 
At the EU level, Regulation No 1060/2009 has been amended by Regulation No 462/2013 
(‘2013 CRA Regulation’)33—a legislative act accompanied by Directive No 14/201334—that 
imposes significant obligations on credit rating agencies. The 2013 CRA Regulation 
addresses major concerns of the governance of CRAs such as the limited competition in the 
ratings industry and the ‘issuer-pays’ business model. The main rationale behind the 
enactment of this legislation is mainly to reduce conflicts of interest and enhance disclosure 
of ratings process. The 2013 CRA Regulation aims to ensure that ‘modifications to the rating 
methodologies do not result in less rigorous methodologies’. Article 8(2) of 2013 CRA 
Regulation requires credit ratings and rating outlooks to be subject on a thorough analysis of 
all the information available.35 However, ‘the real problem is that the agencies’ mathematical 
formulas look backward while life is lived forward, that is unlikely to change’. 36  The 
determination of credit ratings involves subjective judgment. The problem is made worse by 
the fact that investors find it difficult to choose the right financial product because there is no 
appropriate system of disclosure within CRAs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Perspectives, 81; see also Emily Lee, ‘The soft law nature of Basel III and international financial regulations’ 
(2014) 29(10) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 605-606.  
30 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (note 27) 54. 
31 John Authers, ‘Who will teach responsibility in a buck-passing world?’ Financial Times (London, 22 June 
2014). It is pointed out that ‘the “Basel II” bank regulations gave investors a big incentive to buy anything 
stamped triple A by agencies. Ratings were only ever advertised as opinions, based on publicly available 
information: the agencies fell short when investment banks started trying to persuade them that products based 
on subprime mortgages should be rated triple A’.  
32 Angus Duff, ‘The credit ratings agencies and stakeholder relations: issues for regulators’ (2009) 24(1) Journal 
of International Banking and Financial Law, 11. 
33 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (OJ 2013 L 146 p. 1).  
34 Directive 2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Directive 
2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision, Directive 
2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers in respect of over-reliance on credit ratings (OJ 2013 L 145 p. 1).  
35 Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013. The provision states that ‘credit rating agencies shall adopt all 
necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning credit ratings and rating outlooks is of sufficient 
quality and from reliable sources’. 





3. The solicited ratings 
Solicited ratings characterize the ‘issuer-pays’ business model in which CRAs are directly 
paid by their principals (i.e. companies, investment banks). 37  In this situation, potential 
conflicts of interest could arise because of possible collusive actions in the agencies’ 
relationship.38 Since the rating fee is paid by the principal, the issuer may be able to influence 
the rating obtained by threatening to use another agency or none if the rating assigned by the 
agency is too low. As Kaufman noted, ‘CRAs can be subject to reputational costs when they 
engage in inappropriate rating actions: in this regard, disclosure rules help to break the entry 
barrier for smaller rating agencies with strong performance records in a market that is 
dominated by the main CRAs’. 39  A major function of CRAs is to certify to relatively 
uninformed traders that they do not face a significant informational disadvantage, though 
most clients of CRAs are sophisticated (such as investment banks, alternative investment 
funds and sovereign wealth funds).40 However, asymmetries in the market for reputational 
intermediaries hamper their ability to play this role.41 
In conducting their analysis, CRAs may obtain non-public information—such as credit 
agreements, acquisition agreements and private placement memoranda—that is often 
provided pursuant to a confidentiality agreement between the rating agency and the issuer, or 
is provided premised upon the rating agency’s policy to keep such information confidential. It 
can be observed that the issuer needs to invest time and resources in producing the necessary 
information to the CRA on a timely basis.42 Managers and raters are often involved in the 
ratings process and participate in fees discussions. Such a model has the potential for 
conflicts of interest since the entities are paying for the rating.43  
In Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liquidation), the 
court held that the CRA had breached the fiduciary duties it owed with respect to local 
                                                 
37 Lawrence J. White, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 24(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 215.   
38  Tobias Johansson, ‘Regulating credit rating agencies: The issue of conflicts of interest in the rating of 
structured finance products’ (2010) 12(1) Journal of Banking Regulation, 4-5.  
39  George G. Kaufman, ‘The financial turmoil of 2007-20XX: causes, culprits and consequences’ in John 
Raymond Labrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder Singh (eds), Financial Crisis Management and 
Bank Resolution (London: Informa 2009) 4.  
40 Dion Bongaerts, K. J. Martijn Cremers and William N. Goetzmann, ‘Multiple Ratings and Credit Spreads’ 
(2009) National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series No 15331, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15331. 
41 Bernard S. Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’ (2001) 48(4) 
UCLA Law Review, 788. 
42 Angus Duff and Sandra Einig, ‘Debt Issuer: Credit Rating Agency Relations and the Trinity of Solicitude: An 
Empirical Study of the Role of Commitment’ (2015) 129(3) Journal of Business Ethics, 557. 
43 Aline Darbellay, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (London: Edward Elgar 2013) 9. It is observed that ‘the 






councils—as their investment adviser—by recommending products from which agency 
would receive significant fees and profits and that its conduct amounted to a breach of an 
Australian-specific consumer protection prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct.44 
The scenario is further complicated as the CRAs do not owe any duty of care to investors due 
to the absence of contractual relationship. In cases of statements leading to pure financial loss 
there is a requirement for assumption of responsibility for a duty of care to arise, so it 
normally does not arise when there is no contractual relationship.45 The Federal Court of 
Australia in ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council46 and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Moody’s Corp. et al.47 
recognized the fraudulent conduct of the CRAs in providing faulty ratings. These judicial 
decisions brought to light the vulnerability of rating methodologies, showing that credit 
ratings could not be considered a trusty benchmark of the quality of financial products. 
The anomalies of rating methodologies are made worse by the fact that in the ‘issuer-
pays’ business model, conflicts of interest may induce biased ratings with the result of tainted 
information to investors. It can be a problem of incomplete disclosure of information from 
the issuer since the market incentive for companies is to push CRAs for highest assessed 
financial products.48 For instance, the rating process for structured financial products such as 
asset backed securities involves complex models based on mathematical and statistical 
methodologies that are not disclosed due to internal policies.49 However, solicited ratings are 
                                                 
44 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liquidation) [2012] FCA 1028. The Federal 
Court of Australia held that Lehman Brothers Australia, which was called Grange Securities Ltd (Grange), was 
an investment adviser that owed to the Councils fiduciary duties. The credit rating agency represented that its 
products—synthetic collateralised debt obligations (‘SCDOs’)—were prudent, capital protective investments 
and that they complied with statutory and Council policy requirements. Further, the Court found that the SCDOs 
did not have the characteristics that Grange promised to the Councils they would have in their individual 
contracts: that is, the SCDOs did not have a high level of security for the invested capital, were not easily 
tradeable on an established secondary market or able to be readily liquidated for cash and were not suitable 
investments for risk averse Councils.   
45 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 831. The court held that there will be no liability in tort for 
negligent misrepresentation unless the maker of the statement knew that the statement would be communicated 
to the person relying on it specifically in connection with a particular transaction or a transaction of a particular 
kind. The limitation of a liability regime in the presence of sufficient proximity between the auditors and the 
shareholder is made clear in Stone & Rolls v Moore Stephens [2009] 1 A.C. 1391, where the House of Lords 
held that a wider remit of care was owed to creditors. 
46 ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65. 
47 Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Moody’s Corp. et al., U.S. Court of Appeals No. 14-2148 (1st Cir. 
2016). 
48 Robert J. Rhee, ‘Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist’ (2015) 44(2) Economic Notes, 167. It is observed that 
‘there is a problem of coordination as to how much research and resources each firm should provide, resulting in 
a problem of free-riding and efforts to police it’.   
49 Standard & Poor’s provides a ‘Model Governance’ for regulating ‘Covered Models’ (Rating Models, Criteria 
Models, Market Intelligence Models and Ratings Services External Models): use of ‘Covered Models’ is 






subject to other concerns relating to ‘shopping for raters’. Rating shopping generally refers to 
‘a situation in which a firm arranges for several CRAs to rate its forthcoming bond issue, but 
only discloses the most favorable rating’. 50  These concerns are related to the strategic 
behavior of principal and agent.51 In the case of ‘rating shopping’ issuers move from one 
rating agency to another until they get a favorable rating.52 
Big companies might shop for the highest ratings on their lucrative issuance deals, 
including playing one CRA against another when informally consulting them on structures to 
achieve high ratings.53 As Bai claimed, ‘rating agencies that give out lower ratings risk their 
ratings not being selected and thus losing revenue to their less honest peers’. 54  This 
determines lack of competition and huge barriers for new entrants. By contrast reduced 
competition in this case might be good for accuracy as more competition could lead to more 
‘CRA shopping’ by issuers as they will have more options to choose from ratings industry. In 
the case of a new CRA a single fee-paying issuer may comprise a large portion of the CRA’s 
overall revenue, creating a potential conflict of interest that may influence its rating decisions 
should the new entrant fear a loss of this business.55  
As mentioned earlier, the ‘issuer-pays’ model may affect the ratings process through 
biased assessment because of the incentives for firms to influence the ratings in exchange of 
high fees.56 In order to mitigate this problem, it is necessary to divorce issuer payment of the 
CRA from issuer selection of the CRA or encourage an alternative subscriber-pays market for 
ratings.57 A system of standardized revenues could be put in place to reduce reliance on the 
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‘issuer-pays’ business model. 
 
3.1 The unsolicited ratings 
The second service, unsolicited ratings i.e. ratings that CRAs conduct without being 
formally engaged to do so by the issuer, is based on public rated activity in which CRAs are 
not paid by the issuer and conduct their assessment using publicly available information 
about the financial product.58 According to S&P’s, ‘unsolicited ratings are those credit ratings 
assigned at the initiative of S&P’s and not at the request of the issuer or its agents’.59 This 
type of rating is the subject of some controversy in the associated literature60 although it 
seems clear that unsolicited ratings influence the markets and do at least reflect the level of 
public disclosure of the firms rated. CRAs may issue unsolicited ratings to force issuers to 
pay for ratings that they did not request.61 What is more, unsolicited ratings are used as a way 
of establishing a track record before breaking into a new market.62 
Unsolicited ratings have been described as simplistic and opportunistic activities. 
Empirical evidence has shown that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings 
because of self-selection among issuers and the strategic conservatism of rating agencies.63 
This may happen because (1) there is no direct cooperation between issuers and raters and 
because of the incomplete or (2) low quality information in the hands of the ratings agencies. 
On this point, ‘firms that receive unsolicited ratings may feel obliged to request and pay for a 
solicited rating if they believe the unsolicited rating is too low and that its credit reputation 
has been tarnished’.64 
Cantor and Packer argued that unsolicited ratings provide a powerful check against rating 
shopping and can affect the yield paid at issuance.65 Other scholars observed that unsolicited 
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ratings are biased downward in contrast to solicited ratings. 66  In this context, public 
disclosure not only appears to have a positive effect on CRAs but also seems to eliminate the 
downward bias of unsolicited ratings.67 It can be argued that unsolicited ratings are lower (1) 
to ‘punish’ issuers who otherwise would not purchase ratings coverage or (2) because they 
are based only on public information and tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings. 
Further empirical studies find that there is a significant difference in the distributions of 
ratings because banks that have received shadow ratings are smaller and have weaker 
financial profiles than banks that have other ratings.68  
A further area for analysis is whether unsolicited ratings are used to increase market share 
and extract payment from an unwilling issuer. CRAs tend to force companies to purchase 
their services with a view to making a profit. In addition, ‘an unsolicited rating is “feared” 
because it might put an issuer’s credit risk in a worse light than it actually is with the 
justification that it only reflects publicly available information’.69 Unsolicited ratings may 
discourage new entrants from trying to build up a niche position because CRAs have 
traditionally been able to take advantage of economies of scale in ways that may inhibit entry 
for smaller competitors.70  
The 2004 IOSCO Code of Conduct stated that ‘for each rating, the CRA should disclose 
whether the issuer participated in the rating process. Each rating not initiated at the request of 
the issuer should be clearly identified as such’.71 The 2011 IOSCO Report affirmed in “CRA 
Principle Transparency and timeliness of ratings disclosure” that ‘CRAs should make 
disclosure and transparency an objective of their ratings activities’. 72  This principle is 
intended to promote the distribution of sufficient information regarding ratings procedures 
and methodologies owing to the risk of investor confusion in the issuance of unsolicited 
ratings. Consumer confusion arises when ratings do not merely represent additional valuable 
information about the financial products but lead to investor uncertainty and force companies 
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to purchase their services.73  
At the European level, the Commission recommended that disclosure requirements for 
solicited and unsolicited ratings should be strengthened by requiring CRAs to inform issuers 
for which they are in the process of issuing a rating sufficiently in advance of the publication 
of the rating.74 It also included a requirement to elaborate on the main assumptions which 
justify the change of rating. The significant increase over time of references to credit ratings 
in rules and regulations—combined with scarce competition—has affected the business 
model of CRAs by creating a more or less ‘guaranteed market’ with few incentives to 
compete on the basis of rating quality.75 CRAs provide their financial assessments to non-
clients, i.e. unsolicited ratings, even if they have no access to the management or to internal 
due diligence of the firms concerned. In this way, CRAs rely solely on public data that may 
be different from the level of information disclosed by issuers, for instance unsolicited rating 
changes are not likely to convey information as much as solicited rating changes.76  
 
4. The disclosure regime of CRAs  
Information disclosure represents a key aspect of CRAs’ activities. Generally, CRAs 
provide valuable information to those investors who have relatively limited information-
gathering or analysis capacity and therefore cannot make credit evaluations as effectively as a 
rating agency. Those investors who do not have a direct negotiating relationship with the 
issuer. White argued that ‘credit rating firms can help lenders pierce the fog of asymmetric 
information that surrounds lending relationships. Equivalently, credit rating firms can help 
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borrowers (and their credit qualities) emerge from that same fog’.77 However, in contrast with 
this, poor due diligence, lack of research resources or lack of analytical resources and bona 
fide mistakes are the major criticisms leveled against the activities of the rating agencies.78  
Well known financial scandals where the failure in ratings has been clearly evidenced 
(e.g. Enron, WorldCom and Lehman Brothers) have revealed the lack of due diligence and a 
deficiency in the evaluation of corporations’ creditworthiness. 79  However, ‘some of the 
disclosure failures reflected what may be the difficult reality of disclosing what must be, to a 
certain extent, a subjective process over a complex set of financial issues’.80 These corporate 
failures are useful to illustrate the CRAs’ abuses in respect of investor reliance as rating 
governance looked defective in terms of investor protection. In this context, CRAs should be 
subject to professional standards similar to those applicable to other information 
intermediaries—such as auditors and financial analysts—by recasting their responsibilities in 
order to put them under professional duties entailing the requisite degree of care vis-à-vis 
investors.81  
It seems paradoxical that CRAs should be viewed as financial intermediaries intended to 
protect public investors when they enjoy a different regulatory treatment compared with other 
financial experts (auditors and financial analysts).82 The US Dodd-Frank Act 2010 does not 
regard CRAs as ‘investment advisers’, although the value of credit ratings is recognized by 
the reference to liability standards similar to those applicable to other information 
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The imbalanced relationship between issuers and investors is principally determined by 
lack of financial knowledge and causes a distortion of consumers’ choices, particularly at the 
time when the investment operation is executed.84 To ensure rating accuracy, the market 
needs to achieve adequate disclosure protection in terms of reducing agency problems i.e. 
information asymmetries by improving the flow of price information. In other words, the 
market’s judgment would represent the primary evidence of a rating activity, particularly 
through the assessment of information provided by firms. In this context, de Haan and Amtenbrink 
observed that ‘while full disclosure of methodologies can contribute to a better understanding of the value of 
credit ratings, full disclosure could create strong disincentives to use the best available methodologies and to 
invest in better rating methodologies’.85 However, full disclosure of rating methodologies can conflict with the 
efficient allocation of CRAs products as the internal models can be copied by other credit rating agencies. As a 
result, full disclosure of ratings criteria can be suboptimal because of free riding problem (i.e. all those who 
receive the information free of charge from the paying subscriber).86 The reproduction and distribution to public 
of rating models would reduce the ‘rating shopping’ as well as the practice of biased assessments between issuer 
and rater. 
Opportunistic behaviors by CRAs could be avoided by means of the compliance function, 
as a measure falling within the category of internal self-controls, which could limit the need 
to regulate by statute and reduce mandatory disclosure costs. It has been contended that 
‘compliance is, in principle at least, the result of a one-dimensional decision making process: 
individuals and businesses are self-interested utility maximizers who will comply with 
regulation if the probability of swift detection and sanction by the regulator in combination 
with the amount of the penalty outweighs the benefits of noncompliance’.87 In this view, the 
effectiveness of the compliance function introduced by the 2013 CRA Regulation can allow 
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action to be taken against behaviors amounting to misconduct and permit a sound system of 
risk management to be applied.  
The US regulatory framework for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs) requires mandatory disclosures be made by rating agencies as to their rating 
policies and methodology. 88  However, it involves very little direct oversight of the 
performance of an NRSRO to preventing or punishing poor performance. The US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require disclosure of the rating agencies’ policies 
regarding verification of underlying assets and information.89 The usefulness of such general 
disclosures is likely to be limited because they could be written in a way that would allow a 
significant amount of deviation in the use of information and the extent of verification among 
similarly situated asset backed securities.90 The purpose of these rules can be found first in 
the fact that they enhance the reputational cost to rating agencies that engage in inappropriate 
rating actions, and secondly that they help break the entry barrier for smaller rating agencies 
with strong performance records in a market that is dominated by the main CRAs. 91 
Specifically, the disclosure rules aim: (1) to prohibit sales or marketing considerations to 
influence the development of the criteria for determining ratings; (2) to avoid forcing credit 
ratings to embody absolute probabilities of default; and (3) to require each rating agency to 
assign consistent meanings to its rating symbols across sectors.92 
The 2013 CRA Regulation establishes a set of provisions imposing obligations on CRAs 
in connection with structured finance instruments. Article 10(1) of the CRA Regulation 
requires the credit rating agency to disclose ‘any credit rating or rating outlook, as well as any 
decision to discontinue a credit rating, on a non-selective basis and in a timely manner’.93 
Further, CRAs are required to disclose the outcome of the annual internal review of its 
independent compliance function and financial information on the revenue of the credit rating 
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agency.94 ESMA identified several shortcomings related to the CRAs’ internal governance: 
(1) the lack of quality controls over information used and received from data providers; (2)  
incomplete application of the full methodology during the rating monitoring process 
aggravated by insufficient disclosure of the different analytical frameworks used; (3) delays 
in the completion of the annual review of ratings; and (4) need to strengthen the role of the 
internal review function and the activities it performs during the review of methodologies, 
models and key rating assumptions applied to structured finance ratings in order to ensure 
effective independence from the business lines responsible for credit rating activities.95 
When CRAs examine financial statements they ‘rent out’ their reputations for conducting 
a careful evaluation that can catch some fraud and discourage attempts at fraud, and for 
painting a tolerably accurate picture of a company’s performance. In this case, liability risk 
reinforces the rating firm’s concern for reputation and can persuade the CRA to establish 
internal procedures as to ensure transparency of financial statements. Disclosure rules could 
help, as do reputational intermediaries’ incentives to advertise their successes.96 However, 
financial intermediaries will not publicize their own failures, and investors will discount 
competitors’ complaints on the ground that they come from a biased source.97 
 
5. Regulating the CRAs’ conflicts of interest: a way towards compliance 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, CRAs were blamed to exacerbate the 
systemic risk because of their role in the financial markets as an information intermediary 
between investors and issuers.98 As previously indicated, CRAs exhibit potential conflicts of 
interest because they have a financial incentive to accommodate the preferences of bond 
issuers owing to the fact that they are selected and paid by the issuers. This means ratings 
inflation and inaccuracy: issuers desire high ratings not necessarily accurate ratings.99 The 
higher the securities rating, the less concern investors will have about payment default, the 
greater the liquidity and the lower the issuers’ cost of capital. As a result, any investor who 
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relies to any extent on ratings may be unknowingly bearing a risk for which they are not 
being compensated.100 
Conflicts of interest may arise at both the individual rating analyst level and the rating 
agency level.101 A related potential conflict arises in the context of underwriters attempting to 
influence the credit rating process. A large amount of bond offerings is underwritten by a few 
large firms, and the potential conflict exists for CRAs to rate a particular underwriter’s clients 
more favorably in return for future business. The development of ancillary businesses—e.g. 
rating assessment, risk management and consulting services—provided by CRAs has 
increased the catalogue of conflicts. Prior to being issued with a public rating, issuers can 
purchase an ‘indicative’ or private rating, along with ‘advice’ regarding how the company 
might improve its rating. Therefore, the purchase of ancillary services could affect the credit 
rating decision, and issuers may be pressured into using them out of fear that their failure to 
do so could adversely impact their credit rating.  
The growth of the credit derivatives market created the possibility that the use of credit 
ratings in counterparty collateral arrangements would produce a strongly pro-cyclical effect. 
This problem occurred in the case of the American Insurance Group company where 
derivatives were trading with the belief to provide safe collateral if the value of the insured 
securities reduced or if their own creditworthiness dropped.102 As a result, the rapid increased 
of structured finance—mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs)—produced massive and severe rating downgrades determined by the phenomenon of 
‘rating inflation’.103 Ratings inflation was favored by the limited understanding of the risk of 
structured debt and by inaccurate information about the risk characteristics of the underlying 
assets.104 As noted ‘structured products are designed to take advantage of different investor 
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risk preferences; they are typically structured for each tranche to achieve a particular credit 
rating’.105 CRAs knew little or nothing about the underlying assets backing the securitized 
structures they were rating.  
Conflicts of interest may be exacerbated when CRAs involve the executive officers of 
companies to discuss the rating methodology or when CRAs permit issuers to submit the 
details of a proposed structure to them and then advise the issuer of their likely ratings.106 
Consequently, ‘the rating agencies have a direct hand in defining the structure that a 
corporation must adhere to have the lowest possible cost of funding’. 107 CRAs showed 
conflicts of interest during the subprime mortgage crisis not only by giving their highest 
rating to most of the CDOs, but also by allowing issuers to consult raters on the design of the 
CDOs.108 Clearly, the agency compensation arrangement constitutes on the face of it a per se 
conflict of interest. Another justification could be found in the manifest shortcomings in the 
CRAs’ internal controls.109  
As discussed in the solicited ratings, the central question is the issuer-agency relationship 
that characterizes the CRAs’ business model. This relationship is faced with major conflict-
of-interest questions because the interests of issuers in respect of their ratings often do not 
square with the need of investors to receive reliable ratings information.110 In substance, 
conflicts arise: (1) when the issuer pays the rating agency evaluating the issuer’s bonds; (2) 
when CRAs put in place consulting arrangements with the issuers of the bonds they rate; and 
(3) when CRAs take the incentive to set high fees for granting high ratings to their clients and 
a corresponding disincentive to downgrade.  
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However, disclosure of rating services is not sufficient to ensure transparency in the bond 
rating. As ESMA observed, disclosure of each rating grade should be verified by independent 
bodies and not by the raters themselves.111 Publicly available information should be managed 
by an external body to review the CRA’s compliance function independently before it is used 
in a rating report. This body would be separated from ‘modeling staff’ and would be 
responsible for the integrity of reporting lines. This would protect the reputation of the CRAs 
and increase investor confidence in the quality and objectivity of rating activities.  
The intent to reduce the risk of analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the objectivity and 
quality of analyst ratings is the major challenge for regulators. The US Dodd–Frank Act of 
2010 amended Section 15E(w) to prevent issuers, sponsors or underwriters of structured 
finance products from choosing the NRSRO that determine the initial credit ratings on such 
products.112 This provision established the ‘Office of Credit Ratings’, a new organization that 
supports the SEC in supervising the NRSROs—the only CRAs allowed to determine initial 
credit ratings on structured finance products.113 
At the EU level, Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 introduced specific rules aiming to reduce 
long-lasting relationships between rated entities and CRAs and to restore impartiality and 
independence of CRAs.114 Article 6(1) of the 2013 CRA Regulation places an obligation on 
CRAs to ensure that credit ratings are not affected by any existing or potential conflicts of 
interest.115 The rule sets out specific restrictions for a shareholder or a member of a credit 
rating agency that possesses at least five per cent of either the capital or the voting rights in 
that credit rating agency or in a company and has the power to exercise control or a dominant 
influence over that CRA. 116  CRAs are required to complete and publish an annual 
‘transparency report’ containing detailed information about their legal structure and 
ownership, internal quality control systems, record-keeping policies, description of its 
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management and rating analyst rotation policy. 117  It is evident that the objective of the 
European legislator is to enhance transparency measures and to foster the reliability of the 
CRAs’ rating methodologies.118 
In this context, ESMA has adopted a risk-based approach to supervising CRAs and 
improving compliance with the provisions of the 2013 CRA Regulation.119 ESMA’s activities 
include formal requests for information, the conduct of inspections and investigations as well 
as the enforcement actions in appropriate cases (e.g. remedial action plan and the 
appointment of an Independent Investigating Officer).120 However, supervision on CRAs’ 
internal governance—clarity regarding staff roles and responsibilities, and the involvement of 
ratings analysts in business development—seems a difficult task for regulators.121 This risk-
based approach aims to enhance the oversight on CRAs and to improve the application of 
different supervisory tools such as the single Supervision Department, Ratings Data 
Reporting tool and the European Rating Platform. In this light, CRAs need to put in place 
effective compliance functions to ensure that these tools are adequately resourced.122  
According to ESMA, ‘compliance with a number of these points could not be 
demonstrated, typically because policies and procedures did not describe in sufficient detail 
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the different steps of the process followed or did not clearly allocate roles and 
responsibilities’. 123  Closer examination of the ESMA’s supervisory duties leaves the 
impression that rating methodologies are not monitored effectively. ESMA has launched an 
ongoing discussion on the validation and review of CRAs’ internal models in order to explore 
new investigation measures, such as ‘discriminatory power’, ‘predictive power’, ‘historical 
robustness’ and ‘limited quantitative evidence’.124 To enhance ratings accuracy, the Credit 
Rating Agencies Technical Committee provides support to ESMA by promoting supervisory 
convergence and technical standards concerning policy in the area of CRAs.125 
However, Community regulations aim to reinforce the ESMA’s power of supervision may 
clash with the CRAs’ compliance procedures. The upshot is that CRAs can continue their 
activity largely unmonitored within the areas of conflicts of interest and market concentration. 
Indeed, it is instructive that ESMA has published data on the performance of CRAs while 
deploring the absence of clarity on the future obligation regarding structured finance 
instruments.126 This means that CRA continue to respond to the incentives of the rating 
business with the result that they are driven mostly by changes in business cycle variables 
rather than changes in the characteristics of individual firms.127 The internal control system of 
the CRAs should comply with ESMA monitoring measures in order to identify and eliminate 
conflicts of interest and to disclose to markets. In this context, ESMA supervisory actions are 
directed to ensure the independence of the CRAs’ activities and to prevent potential collusive 
behaviour from influencing the quality of ratings. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Recent history shows too well that CRAs have not lived up to what may reasonably be 
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expected of them. The existence of admitted conflicts of interests cannot just be shrugged 
aside. Moreover, there is some evidence that CRAs may use the threat of an unsolicited credit 
rating to pressurize firms into opting for a solicited rating.128  
CRAs have acknowledged the existence of the issuer-pays conflict of interests and the 
more benign risk of error, but have typically downplayed their significance, stating that their 
reputations are far too valuable to the success of their businesses for them either to succumb 
to the biases inherent in the ‘issuer-pays’ revenue model or to issue inaccurate ratings.129 
Individual investors rely on the ratings because of their perceived authority, while 
institutional investors rely on them because of their market authority. The fact that financial 
products need to be labeled for ensuring substantial revenues to companies implies a high 
demand for CRAs. Further, the fact that financial firms need to be rated for gaining 
reputation in the securities markets means not only a pushed involvement of rating activities 
but also a qualified reliance on flawed assessment.130 On this view, the frenetic growth in 
structured finance brought about not only a biased relationship with issuers but also a 
lucrative use of CRAs.131  
What is crucial for the operation of the legal protection for investors is the soundness of 
CRAs’ actions in interpreting disclosed information and assessing the creditworthiness of 
companies, thereby increasing market confidence. In other words, investors should be 
ensured of the appropriate level of information on which to make decisions. It is evident that 
some individual investors are unskilled and make poor decisions about risk even when they 
have obtained full information about the products. Essentially, adequacy of disclosure is a 
gauge to determine what an investor knew or should have known based on the information 
available to him.132 Ratings have become the arbiter of any securities transaction as well as an 
essential reference for investors: the global financial markets have credit ratings hard-wired 
into them, and it seems difficult for regulators to push for changing the ‘ratings game’.133 The 
crux of matter is the accuracy and integrity of ratings since the CRAs maintain their 
                                                 
128 Patrick Van Roy (note 67) 24-25. 
129 Tim Wittenberg, ‘Regulatory Evolution of the EU Credit Rating Agency Framework’ (2015) 16(4) European 
Business Organization Law Review, 677. 
130  Peter Green and Jeremy Jennings-Mares, ‘Demand That Gave Rise to Complexity’ Financial Times 
(London, 4 July 2008). 
131  Gerard Caprio Jr., Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane, ‘The 2007 Meltdown in Structured 
Securitization: Searching for Lessons, not Scapegoats’ (2010) 25(1) The World Bank Research Observer, 132-
133.  
132 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Information Asymmetry and Information Failure: Disclosure Problems in Complex 
Financial Markets’ in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and the Global 
Financial Crisis (Cambridge: CUP 2011) 95. 
133 Imad A Moosa, ‘The regulation of credit rating agencies: A realistic view’ (2017) 18(2) Journal of Banking 





conflicted business models. Although CRAs provide valuable information in the financial 
system and are subject to considerable scrutiny they largely escape accountability.  
